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STATE MAY NOT COMPEL ASSOCIATION
TO DISCLOSE NAMES OF MEMBERS
NAACP v. dlabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958)
Alabama sought to enjoin the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People from further activities within the state. This
action was precipitated by the failure of the Association, a New York
nonprofit membership corporation, to qualify as a foreign corporation
doing business within the state. The state denied the Association's claim
to exemption, and alleged irreparable injury to the property and civil
rights of the citizens of Alabama. 1
With regard to the qualification issue the trial court ordered the
production of Association records including a list of the names and
addresses of all Alabama members. The defendant complied with the
order in other respects, but refused upon constitutional grounds to pro-
duce its membership lists.
The Association was convicted for civil contempt and fined. The
contempt action was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court,2 and
certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court.3 Two
questions had to be decided: Did the petitioner have standing to assert the
constitutional rights of its members? Did the court order unconsti-
tutionally restrict the freedom of association of petitioner's members?
Mr. Justice Harlan, in voicing the unanimous opinion of the Court,
4
recognized its broad policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where
possible,5 but here chose to follow its more recent holdings in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath6 and Barrows v. Jackson,7
that representatives have standing where the constitutional rights of
1 The bill in equity cited among other items the furnishing of financial and
legal assistance to Negro students seeking admission to the state university and
to the support of a Negro boycott of Montgomery bus lines in an effort to compel
seating of passengers without consideration of race.
2 Ex parte NAACP, 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214 (1956).
3 NAACP v. Alabama, 353 U.S. 972 (1957).
4 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
5 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
6 341 U.S. 123, 183-87 (1951) (concurring opinion). An organization placed
upon the United States Attorney General's list of subversive groups to which
federal employees could not belong was permitted to assert the constitutional rights
of these employee members.
7346 U.S. 249 (1953). The defendant in a damage action for breach of a
racial restrictive convenant in a deed was permitted to raise the constitutional
rights of those who were prevented by the covenant from purchasing land. Accord,
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persons not before the Court can be protected effectively only through
representation. In the instant case, if the rank-and-file members them-
selves had asserted their right to remain anonymous, an appearance in
court would have nullified that right by destroying their anonymity.
This preliminary decision enabled the Court to consider whether
the disclosure order constituted an unwarranted limitation upon the mem-
bers' freedom of association.' It recognized as a practical matter that
disclosure of affiliation with a group publicly advocating an unpopular
position is likely to restrain one's free association with such group.
Members of a particular religious faith or political party could not, for
example, be required to wear identifying arm-bands.9 The Court made
reference to the fact that past disclosure of Association membership had
exposed the members to physical and economic coercion, as well as to
other signs of public hostility.
Whether this repressive effect actually constitutes state action pre-
sents more of a problem, but this seemingly did not trouble the Court.
It held that even though the restraint in the final analysis would come
from private sources it was the initial exercise of state power which
would permit the private pressure to take effect. One questions whether
this has not somewhat broadened the concept of state action developed in
Shelley v. Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson where judicial enforcement
of racial restrictive covenants was held to constitute state action.1" There
the agreements were of a private nature to be enforced by the state.
Here the state would make a disclosure and the actual coercion would
come from private sources. Both are now considered to be state action
conflicting with constitutional rights.
Once the Court determines that there is a limitation upon freedom
of association by the state it must determine whether that limitation is
constitutionally justified. This is essentially a balancing process between
the interests of those restricted and the interests of the state. First
amendment rights occupy a high position in the hierarchy of constitu-
Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
8 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people
peaceably to assemble. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I; ". . . nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .... .
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. For authority that freedom of association is among
the liberties protected by the due process clause see Staub v. City of Baxley,
355 U.S. 313, 321 (1958); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 364 (1937) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
9 Amer. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 539 U.S. 382, 402 (1950). Cf.
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), a publisher cannot be required to
disclose the identity of those who purchase his books.
10 Judicial enforcement of a private agreement constitutes state action, Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); judicial award of a damage remedy constitutes
state action, Barrows v. Jackson, supra note 7.
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tional freedoms and may -be limited only when the state has a compelling
interest."
When citizens abuse the exercise of these freedoms the state may
act to curb the abuse in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare
or convenience, but it must not curtail the rights themselves."2 Any
attempt to restrict these first amendment freedoms must dearly be in the
public interest and must be justified by a clear and present danger.13
The Court was unable to find a justification for the Alabama
decree. The sole objective of the equity action was a determination
whether the Association was conducting intrastate business in violation
of Alabama's foreign corporation qualification act. Two issues in question
were whether the Association was subject to the statute, and if so,
whether its activities warranted expulsion from the state. Production of
the membership lists was expected to help resolve these issues.
Without passing upon the merits of either issue the Court found
that disclosure of the names of the rank-and-file members had no sub-
stantial bearing upon either of them.' 4 The production order was not a
reasonable means by which to accomplish the objective. Petitioner had
already conformed with the other items demanded, including a list of
its officers, the total number of its members and the amount of their
dues. It is difficult to see how the names of the members could have
contributed anything to the inquiry. In brief, the state failed to show an
interest in the names sufficient to warrant an invasion of the members'
constitutional rights.
The Court might well have stopped here, but it chose to go further.
The state supreme court relied upon Ex parte Morris5 from its own
jurisdiction. Respondent relied heavily in its argument upon New York
ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman.'6  In both cases a state was upheld in
requiring membership lists to be submitted by branches of the Ku Klux
Klan. Mr. Justice Harlan carefully distinguished the Bryant case from
11 Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (concurring opinion).
12 Keeping public streets clean does not justify prohibiting the distribution
of religious literature, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) ; privilege of
using streets and parks to communicate may be regulated, but may not be abridged
or denied, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) ; mere participation in a
meeting of the Communist Party may not be made a crime, Dejonge v. Oregon,
supra note 8, at 364-65.
13Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). .Accord, West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ; Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941); Gitlow v. New York, supra note 8, at 672; Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
14 In Sweezey v. New Hampshire, supra note 11, at 254, the Court stated
with reference to petitioner's membership in the Progressive Party: "Thus, if
the Attorney General's interrogation of petitioner were in fact wholly unrelated
to the object of the legislature in authorizing the inquiry, the due process
clause would preclude the endangering of constitutional liberties."
15252 Ala. 551, 42 So. 2d 17 (1949).
16278 U.S. 63 (1928).
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the instant case, stressing the difference in nature between the two
organizations. In Bryant the Ku Klux Klan had perpetrated acts of
intimidation and violence to such an extent that the Court took judicial
notice of them. The Klan also refused to furnish the State of New York
with any information concerning its activities. The state has a great
interest in curbing the action of such an organization. The Association,
in contrast, has sought to enforce its doctrines through the courts. In
this action it complied with the equity decree except for the production of
membership lists. With this type of organization the state's interest in
limiting its activities is slight. In one case state interest outweighs the
constitutional interest of the group's members; in the other it does not.
Alabama did not have a strong position in this case. Except for
broadening the concept of state action the Court follows quite closely
its previous holdings in the area of free speech and assembly. The de-
cision is clearly in line with precedent. Its major significance lies in the
clear manner in which Mr. Justice Harlan reveals the process by which
the 'Court balances the interest of the public against the interests of
private citizens within the framework of the due process clause.
In this action Alabama sought to curb the activities of the Associ-
ation by acting entirely through the judicial branch of its government.
It was a court decree and not a statute which called for production of
the membership lists. As a result the Court was not obligated to give any
deference to a legislative finding of a need for restrictionY There was
no finding of a dear and present danger to the public. Had there been a
legitimate legislative finding of a clear and present danger the position
of the state undoubtedly would have been stronger.
A Virginia statute requiring the registration of anyone advocating
either racial integration or segregation in public schools, or raising funds
to finance racial litigation has recently been challenged before a federal
district court."8 The expressed purpose of the act was to prevent the
danger of racial violence, a danger found by the legislature to exist.
The district court, however, after examining the legislative history of the
act, found its real purpose to be the prevention of the enforcement of
lawful integration of the races, and declared the statute to be invalid.
What effect a legislative finding of clear and present danger in this area
would have in swaying the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
remains to be seen. Certainly the Court would examine the foundation
for such a finding with great care.
Frank M. Hays
17 In Amer. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 9, at 401, the Court
stated: "The deference due legislative determination of the need for restriction
upon particular forms of conduct has found repeated expression in this Court's
opinions."
3.8 NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958).
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